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Abstract: Income- re l a t ed  inequa l i t i e s  in  hea l th  c a r e  a cce s s  have  been  found  in  
s eve ra l  European  coun t r i e s  bu t  l i t t l e  i s  known  abou t  the  ex t en t  o f  inequa l i t i e s  in  
the  p rov i s ion  o f  Long  Te rm Care  s e rv i c e s  (LTC) .  Th i s  pape r  f i l l s  th i s  g ap :  i t  
add re s se s  equ i t y  i s sue s  r e l a t ed  to  the  p rov i s ion  o f  home  ca re  s e rv i ce s  a c ros s  th ree  
mac ro -a r ea s  in  Europe  wh ich  a r e  h igh l y  he t e rogeneous  in  t e rms  o f  the  deg ree  o f  
pub l i c  f in anc ing  o f  LTC and  the  s t r eng th  and  the  soc i a l  v a lue  o f  f am i l y  t i e s .   
Us ing  c ros s - coun t r y  compara t i ve  m ic ro -da t a  f rom SHARE (Su rvey  o f  Hea l th ,  
Age ing  and  Re t i r emen t  in  Europe )  su rvey ,  we  e s t ima te  and  decompose  an  
Er reyge r s  concen t r a t ion  index  o f  the  u se  o f  bo th  pa id  domes t i c  he lp  ( “unsk i l l ed”  
ca r e )  and  pe r sona l  nu r s ing  c a r e  ( “ sk i l l ed”  ca r e ) ,  measu r ing  the  con t r ibu t ion  o f  
income ,  needs  and  non-needs  f a c to r s  to  ove ra l l  i n equa l i t y .  We  ba se  the  
decompos i t ion  on  a  b iva r i a t e  p rob i t  mode l  wh ich  t ake s  in to  accoun t  the  r ec ip roca l  
i n t e r ac t ion  be tween  fo rma l  and  in fo rma l  home  ca re  u se .  We  f ind  ev idence  o f  h i gh  
hor i zon ta l  i nequ i t y  in  the  u se  o f  unsk i l l ed  home  ca r e  in  a r ea s  where  pub l i c  
f in anc ing  o f  LTC i s  r e l a t i v e l y  low  (Sou the rn  Europe )  wh i l e  modera t e  inequa l i t i e s  
emerges  in  a r ea s  where  pub l i c -p r iva t e  m ix  o f  f in anc ing  i s  more  ba l anced  
(Con t inen ta l   Europe ) .  A t  the  s ame  t ime ,  we  do  no t  de t ec t  i nequ i t y  in  Nor the rn  
Europe  cha rac t e r i z ed  by  h igh  pub l i c  spend ing  on  un ive r s a l  s e rv i ce s  equ i t ab l e  fo r  
a l l ,  i n c lud ing  LTC pub l i c  cove rage .  In  a l l  a r e a s ,  i n fo rma l  c a r e  ha s  been  found  to  
be  a  subs t i tu t e  fo r  pa id  unsk i l l ed  c a r e  among  the  poor  and  th i s  con t r ibu te s  to  
fu r the r  skew ing  the  d i s t r ibu t ion  o f  the  u se  o f  fo rma l  c a r e  s e rv i ce s  towards  the  
r i ch .  
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Home Sweet Home?  Public Financing and Inequalities in the use of Home Care Services in 
Europe1 
 
Vincenzo Carrieri∗ Cinzia Di Novi+, Cristina Elisa Orso♣ 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Income-related inequalities in health care access have been found in several European countries but little is 
known about the extent of inequalities in the provision of Long Term Care services (LTC). This paper fills 
this gap: it addresses equity issues related to the provision of home care services across three macro-areas in 
Europe which are highly heterogeneous in terms of the degree of public financing of LTC and the strength 
and the social value of family ties.  Using cross-country comparative micro-data from SHARE (Survey of 
Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe) survey, we estimate and decompose an Erreygers concentration 
index of the use of both paid domestic help (“unskilled” care) and personal nursing care (“skilled” care), 
measuring the contribution of income, needs and non-needs factors to overall inequality. We base the 
decomposition on a bivariate probit model which takes into account the reciprocal interaction between 
formal and informal home care use. We find evidence of high horizontal inequity in the use of unskilled 
home care in areas where public financing of LTC is relatively low (Southern Europe) while moderate 
inequalities emerges in areas where public-private mix of financing is more balanced (Continental  Europe). 
At the same time, we do not detect inequity in Northern Europe characterized by high public spending on 
universal services equitable for all, including LTC public coverage. In all areas, informal care has been found 
to be a substitute for paid unskilled care among the poor and this contributes to further skewing the 
distribution of the use of formal care services towards the rich. 
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1. Introduction 
 
An extensive literature documents the existence of income-related inequalities in the access to health 
care in Europe for a wide set of medical and preventive health care services (e.g. Carrieri and Wuebker, 2013, 
Jusot and Sirven, 2011; Lorant et al., 2002; van Doorslaer et al. 2000, 2006). These inequalities persist also 
after controlling for the different distribution of needs across income groups, thus raising important ethical 
concerns. Indeed, the presence of needs-adjusted income-related inequalities in the use of health services 
represents the violation of the well-known horizontal equity principle according to which people in equal 
need ought to be treated equally irrespective of their income position. For this reason, several countries have 
undertaken systematic policy actions to measure, monitor and tackle these inequities (see, for instance, the 
English Action Report, Department of Health, 2009).    
Despite the increasing attention towards inequity in health care access, until today, little is known 
about the extent and the determinants of horizontal inequity in the access to long-term care (hereafter LTC) 
services, namely health, social and residential services provided to chronically disabled persons over an 
extended period of time. This lack of evidence is troublesome for at least three reasons. Firstly, these services 
are more often used by the elderly people who represent a significant and growing percentage of the 
European population: forecasts for European demographics show that around half the population of the EU-
27 countries will be over fifty in the year 2060, while over-65-year-olds will increase from the current value of 
17.4% to 30% (Eurostat, 2010). This means that the next decades will see increasing rates of care-dependent 
older people in need of LTC. Secondly, demographic and cultural trends in European countries are changing 
the traditional patterns of care. Although the family still acts as a strong support network for the elderly, the 
demographic transition, the de-familiarization process and the dramatic increase in female labor force 
participation have reduced the possibilities of providing care informally. The increasing demand for care, in 
combination with a reduced potential for informal care, is likely to result in a need to expand formal care 
services (Crespo and Mira, 2010; Di Novi et al., 2015; Brenna and Di Novi, 2015). Thirdly, public financial 
resources available to pay for LTC assistance are continuously decreasing (Costa-Font, 2010) and this may 
increase income-related inequalities in the access to LTC services, especially in Countries where the extension 
of LTC public insurance is relatively low.  
In this paper we measure and explain inequalities in the provision of formal LTC services among 
European elderly (over 65 years old) using cross-country comparative micro-data from SHARE (Survey of 
Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe) survey. Specifically, we focus on the inequality in the access to 
home care services which cover a wide range of needs: from homemaking and companionship to meal 
preparation and medication reminder to personal care services and help with the activities of daily living such 
as bathing and dressing.  We investigate inequities across three macro-areas in Europe using a stratification 
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which reflects differences in the degree of public financing of LTC services and in the degree of responsibility 
for the provision of informal care which is generally attributed to the individual by local social norms (see 
section 2.1 for more details). 
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. Firstly, we explore the level of horizontal inequities in the access 
to home care services, testing whether elderly individuals, with the same level of need, experience a difference 
in the level of utilization related to their income. We measure income inequalities in home care use by means 
of the corrected version of the concentration index for binary dependent variables (Erreygers, 2009). 
Following Bonsang (2009), we consider separately two types of formal home care: skilled (nursing care) and 
low-skilled (paid domestic help) formal home care.   
Secondly, we decompose the Erreygers index into the contributions of income, need and non-need 
factors following the method adopted by Van Doorslaer Koolman and Jones (2004) in the analysis of 
income-related inequalities in medical care. This decomposition technique allows us to explain the 
determinants of the inequity observed in the three European macro-areas. An important element of novelty 
of our empirical strategy is that we base the Erreygers index decomposition also on a bivariate probit model 
with exclusion restrictions which takes into account the reciprocal interaction between formal and informal 
home care, thus controlling for the potential simultaneity between formal care and informal care (see also 
Van Houtven and Norton, 2004; Bolin et al., 2008; Bonsang, 2009; Balia and Brau, 2013).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 illustrates 
the empirical model, while the results are presented and discussed in Section 4. Concluding remarks are 
reported in Section 5. The description of the bivariate probit model, the definition of the variables, 
descriptive statistics and tables with estimation coefficients are in Appendix. 
 
2. Data 
 
The individual-level data employed in this study are drawn from the second wave of SHARE (Survey 
of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe). SHARE, coordinated by the Mannheim Research Institute for 
the Economics of Aging (MEA), collects detailed information on a wide variety of aspects, among which the 
health status, health care access and socio-economic characteristics of people aged 50+ in Europe. The design 
is based on the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and the English Longitudinal Study of Ageing (Borsh- 
Supan and Jurges, 2005).   
The survey information for the second wave of SHARE was collected between the end of 2006 and 
the summer of 2007 respectively, through Computer-Assisted Personal Interviews (CAPI) supplemented by a 
self-completion paper. Our analysis is based on version 2.5.0 of SHARE’s second wave. Data are used from 
the following 10 European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. After careful consideration, we decided to exclude three countries that were 
incorporated in this wave of SHARE, namely Switzerland, the Czech Republic and Poland. Switzerland and 
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the Czech Republic were not included since the indicator of home care contains too many missing values. 
Poland was excluded since information concerning informal care and formal care received at home was not 
available.  
Three selection criteria were imposed on the sample: 1) respondents should be 65 years of age or 
above, 2) not living with children and 3) not permanently live in a nursing home. After correcting for the 
missing values, the final sample includes 9239 observations. 2 
 
2.1 The Provision of LTC in Europe: Differences between Macro-Areas 
 
Previous studies have demonstrated that the use of formal and informal care services is generally 
dependent on two main factors: i) societal attributes, such as the availability of public LTC insurance 
coverage and ii) the strength and the social value of family ties (see also Brenna and Di Novi, 2015; Di Novi 
et al; 2015; Crespo and Mira, 2014; Bolin et al, 2008).  Both factors are highly heterogeneous across European 
macro- areas and this may result in important differences in the use of such as services.  
The social value of family ties and the design of the long-term care systems highlight where the 
primary responsibility for meeting care needs lies. It may lie with the individual (Scandinavian model), the 
nuclear family (Continental model) or the extended family (Mediterranean model).  Consistently with these 
differences in the share of public coverage and in the social values of family ties, we stratify our sample into 
three models that we label as Northern, Continental and Southern Europe. Northern Europe model includes 
Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands and is characterized by high public financing of LTC and an 
individual responsibility in the provision of LTC.  Continental Europe model includes Austria, Belgium, 
France and Germany which are characterized by a “moderate” public financing of LTC and a nuclear family 
responsibility in the provision of LTC services. Finally, Southern Europe model includes Italy, Spain and 
Greece which are characterized by a low public financing of LTC and a high responsibility of the extended 
family in the provision of LTC services.  
The OECD Health Data (2011) which show the LTC public expenditure as a share of national GDP 
support our classification.  Figure 1(see Appendix II) shows that the public system of long-term care is most 
generous in Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands: they spend respectively 3.7%, 3.6% and 2.4% of their 
GDP on LTC. These Countries offer universalistic public coverage for LTC services and the state 
responsibility for providing care services for older people is greater than in the other European countries. At 
the opposite side Southern European countries have a thinner formal long term care system and formal home 
care network: the role of the state is minimal and  LTC financing is highly privatized; here the expectation is 
that social care will be mainly provided within the family (see also Costa-Font and Zigante, 2014). Figure 1 
shows that Spain and Greece spend 0.7% and a bit less of 0.1% of their GDP on LTC, respectively.3  In 
                                                
2 According to Bonsang (2009), we exclude respondents living with their children since SHARE does not provide information 
about the way, the type, and the importance of the transfers that take place within a household. 
3 Data for Italy expenditure were missing since they are not included in the OECD data we used (see Figure 1).  
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between these two extremes, a third cluster, the Continental countries (Austria, France, Germany, Belgium) 
which are characterized by moderate levels of formal and informal care provision. Continental countries 
show a “moderate” level of public expenditure on LTC as a percentage of GDP which ranges from 1% in 
Germany to 2% in Belgium. 
The countries classification proposed here presents some parallels with Esping-Andersen’s (1990) 
traditional classification of welfare states: similar to Esping-Andersen’s (1990) approach we consider as first 
cluster the Scandinavian/Northern group of countries that is close to Esping-Andersen’s “social-democratic” 
regime cluster with high levels of state support (indeed LTC insurance is mainly delegated to the public 
sector) and in which welfare coverage is universal and attempts to treat all citizens equally. In Esping-
Andersen, France, Germany, Austria and Belgium are grouped together into the “conservative” regime 
cluster characterized by the preservation of the status quo and its inequalities. Social rights tend to be 
attached to class and what one has earned by one’s work effort. Esping-Andersen’s traditional classification 
includes also Italy in the conservative group, while we assigned Italy to another cluster: the Southern Europe 
cluster. It seems appropriate to classify the South European countries as a separate cluster when attention is 
shifted to the care sector: Southern European countries such as Greece, Italy and Spain form a distinctive 
cluster due to the strong role of the extended family and lower welfare services (Mingione, 2001).  
 
3. Empirical Model  
 
3.1 The Erreygers Concentration Index 
Our empirical analysis involves two basic steps. Firstly, we measure income related inequality in home 
care use employing Erreygers’ Concentration Index and then we decompose Erreygers’ Concentration Index 
into the contribution of income, need and non-need factors to explain inequality across countries.  
Socio-economic inequalities in home care use are calculated by means of a Concentration Index (CI) 
(Wagstaff et al., 1991; Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer 2000). The following concentration index measures 
socioeconomic inequality in access to home care services: 
n
i i i i
i 1
2 2CI y R 1 *cov(y ,R )
nµ µ=
= − =∑     (1) 
 
where   is the average access to home care service in the sample, n for the sample size,  y is an indicator of 
access to home care services by individual i and Ri designates the ith individual´s rank within the income 
distribution. The equation (1) shows that the value of the CI equals the covariance between the indicator of 
home care access (yi) and the individual’s living standard rank (Ri), divided by the average of the access ( ). 
Then, the whole expression is multiplied by 2 to ensure that the CI ranges between -1 and +1. 
Since home care is a bounded variable (i.e. home care utilization yes or no), we use the corrected 
version of the concentration index as suggested by Erreygers (2009). We need to use a generalized 
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concentration index – defined as concentration index as in (1) multiplied by the mean of home care use –  to 
satisfy the mirror condition, namely the invariance of country ranking to the coding of home care services 
utilization as 0 or 1. The Erreygers index satisfies this property. It is an absolute inequality index as it weights 
inequality constantly and independent of the average use in a country (see also Kjellsson and Gerdtham, 
2013). This index is particularly appropriate for situations in which average use of home care services strongly 
differs among countries as in our case. 
The formula for the corrected concentration index is: 
( ) ( )
(
4
)n n
E y C y
b a
µ
=
−
    (2) 
Where bn and an represent the maximum and minimum of the home care access variable (y) (in our case 0 and 
1),   is the mean of the home care access variable in the population, and C (y) represents the Concentration 
Index specified in (1). 
 
As a second step, we decompose socio-economic inequality as follows:   
 
_ _ _ _
( ) 4* ( ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )  
 
n icr r r nn nn nn n n ic ic i
nn n ic
EI y x CI x x CI x x CI x x CI x GCIβ β β β ε# $= + + + +% &
' (
∑ ∑ ∑  (3) 
Where
_
rx ,
_
nnx ,
_
nx , and 
_
icx  represent respectively the means of income (xr), non-need variables (xnn), need 
variables (xn) and informal care (xic). ( )rCI x , ( ) pCI x , ( )nCI x  and ( )icCI x their concentration indices, 
( ) iGCI ε is a residual term.  
Equation (3) shows that socio-economic inequalities in home care use can be represented as a 
weighted sum of the inequalities in its determinants. The weights are represented by the regression 
coefficients evaluated at the means (i.e. semi-elasticities). The decomposition provides the possibility of 
identifying the driving factors of inequalities in the use of home care services among the elderly: the higher 
the inequality (CI) or the semi-elasticity, the higher the contribution (Bonfrer et al., 2012). 
Decomposition of the concentration index as in equation (3) is based on linear modeling of home 
care use.  However, since the outcome variable in this study is binary, the decomposition is possible only 
through a linear approximation based on partial effects (the betas in equation 3) estimated by a non-linear 
model (Van Doorslaer et. Al, 2004).  
In this application, the situation is further complicated by the inclusion of informal care among the 
dependent variables in the formal care access equation. Indeed, informal care and formal home care may be 
simultaneously determined (Van Houtven and Norton, 2004.) This may be due to the fact that the receipt of 
informal care may be correlated to unobserved health characteristics or to unobserved preferences for care 
that are likely to influence the demand for home care (Charles and Sevak, 2005; Bonsang, 2013).  For these 
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reasons, we computed the partial effects in equation (3) through a recursive bivariate probit model. The 
recursive structure of the bivariate probit model builds on a first structural form equation determining the 
receipt of formal home care and a second reduced form equation for the potentially endogenous dummy 
measuring the receipt of informal care; it also relies on exclusion restrictions (details on this model are 
provided in the Appendix I). When exogeneity cannot be rejected, i.e. the estimated correlation coefficient 
between equations in the bivariate probit model is not significantly different from zero, we base the 
decomposition on a standard probit. In the standard probit we employ robust standard errors by applying a 
Huber-White sandwich estimator that corrects for heteroskedasticity of unknown form.  
To draw inference on the concentration indices and on the contributions of each explanatory variable, 
we use a non-parametric bootstrap method with 1000 replications. The bootstrap method is adapted to 
reflect the stratified sampling with respect to the primary sampling unit of the SHARE survey. All 
computations are repeated on each resampled data set and the variability is used to obtain standard errors. 
 
3.2 The Inequality Decomposition 
 
In order to investigate equity issues related to the provision of home care services the model is 
estimated by considering separately skilled (nursing care) and low-skilled (paid domestic help) formal home 
care (see Bonsang, 2009).  In the probit/bivariate probit models the dependent variables employed to predict 
the probability of receiving formal home care services are binary variables (see Table 1 for variable 
definitions). 
The independent variables employed to predict the demand for home care services were categorized 
into three dimensions: 1) income; 2) need factors related to aspects of individuals’ health status; 3) non-need 
factors. 
Income information is based on total annual household income, obtained by adding up its different 
components assessed in the questionnaire after deductions for income tax and social or national insurance 
contributions. It mainly comprises labor income, public pensions and income from assets. To get the annual 
“equivalent household income” we adjusted for household size and composition. The equivalence scale 
formula is: 
( )( )0.5
 
    / .    0.5 *  .  .Equivalent income family income No of adults No of children= +
 
 
Need variables include age and several measures of health status. Following Bolin et al. (2008) we 
included, as measures for the need for formal care, indicators of self-perceived health, number of activity 
limitations, number of health conditions and number of symptoms. Concerning self-perceived health the 
following standard self-assessed health (SAH) status question was asked: “Would you say that in general your 
health is: excellent, very good, good, fair, poor”. SAH was therefore measured on a five-point scale from 
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'excellent' (score 5) to “poor” (score 1) and treated as an ordered categorical variable. The use of SAH as an 
indicator of health status is supported by evidence which shows a strong predictive relationship between 
people's self-rating of health and morbidity (Idler and Benyamini, 1997; Kennedy et al., 1998). Moreover, 
SAH correlates strongly with more complex health indices such as functional ability or indicators derived 
from health service use (Undén and Elofsson, 2006).  
We also included a continuous variable that captures the number of problems with functioning and 
disability: this indicator concerns the self-reported difficulty performing tasks related to mobility, strength and 
endurance (Nagi, 1976). The ten indicators of functioning ability include: walking one block, climbing several 
flights of stairs, climbing one flight of stairs, sitting for about 2 hours, getting up from a chair, lifting or 
carrying weights over 10 lbs, stooping, kneeling or crouching, picking up a dime from a table, reaching or 
extending arms and pulling or pushing large objects. 
Then, we considered among the proxies of the need for care the number of health conditions (heart 
problems, high blood pressure, high cholesterol, stroke, diabetes, lung disease, asthma, arthritis, osteoporosis, 
cancer, ulcer, Parkinson disease, cataracts, hip or femoral fracture, psychological problems, other). In addition 
to chronic diseases, we controlled for health symptoms: a continuous variable that is the sum of different 
symptoms that the individual suffered from during the last 6 months (e.g., sleeping problems, falling down, 
persistent cough, fatigue, swollen leg, and dizziness). The average is 2.03 symptoms ranging between 0 to11. 
These symptoms were used as a proxy for the remaining overall health situation of the respondent. 
Non-need variables included education, marital status and residential area. Education was measured 
by ISCED-97 classification. Three levels of education were considered: 1) low education (no educational 
certificates or primary school certificate or lower secondary education); 2) medium education (upper 
secondary education or high school graduation); 3) high education (university degree or postgraduate). Marital 
status was categorized into “living with a spouse or a partner in the same household” and “living as single.” 
We included also a rural/urban variable to proxy the potential lack of access to formal care services and social 
services for individuals living in rural areas. The following question was asked: ‘‘how would you describe the 
area where you live? A big city; the suburbs or outskirts of a big city; a large town; a small town; a rural area 
or village?’’ We dichotomized the variable into urban and rural, the latter including only people living in a 
rural area or village. 
Finally, among the independent variables, we considered informal care received from children. For 
informal care we mean personal care (e.g. dressing, bathing or showering, eating, getting in or out of bed, and 
using the toilet), practical household help (e.g. home repairs, gardening, transportation, shopping, and 
household chores), and help with paperwork (e.g. filling out forms, and settling financial or legal matters). We 
built a binary variable that takes value one if respondent answered that he/she received informal care on at 
least weekly basis during the year of the interview.  
 
 
 9 
 
 
4. Results 
 
Table 1 presents summary statistics of the main variables used in the model for the whole sample, as 
well as for the three models, Northern, Continental, and Southern Europe, separately. Considering the whole 
sample the mean age of respondents is 74 years, and 53% of the sample is represented by women. Around 
8% of the interviewed receives personal nursing care in the baseline year, while 3% of the respondents 
receives paid domestic help. We observe some differences in the use of home care services between the three 
areas. We find that 12% of respondents receive paid domestic help in the Northern countries, 11% in 
Continental countries and less than 5% in the South of Europe. Concerning the use of nursing care, we find 
that less than 6% of respondents receive this kind of care in Northern countries, 12.5% in the Continental 
countries and 3.5% in the Southern countries. 
 
We will discuss the results separately for each type of formal home care considered in the analysis: 
skilled (nursing care) and low-skilled (paid domestic help). Firstly, we show the EI index estimates and then 
the decomposition results for each macro-region. Tables with the results from the univariate and bivariate 
probit models employed for the decomposition are provided in detail in Appendix II. The bivariate model 
showed in many cases significant correlation coefficients between the error term of the structural equation for 
formal home care and the reduced form equation for informal care (see Appendix I). Hence, the 
decomposition results presented in the following were often based on the partial effect computed using the 
bivariate probit estimates. When the exogeneity condition was not rejected, the decomposition was based on 
the probit model. Estimates of correlation coefficients between formal and informal care equation have been 
included in Tables 2.a and 2.b for domestic help and personal nursing care, respectively. 
 
Domestic Help 
 
          Table 2.a presents the estimates of Erreygers indices, partial effects and inequality contributions by 
macro-region for domestic help. Statistically significant coefficients, indices and contributions are indicated in 
bold. 
 
(Table 2.a) 
 
           The first two rows of Table 2.a report the overall Erreygers index (EI) and the Erreygers Index 
adjusted for need (ENA), respectively. A negative value (EI or ENA) denotes a concentration favoring the 
poor, while a positive value implies a concentration in favor of the high-income groups.  
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           We found positive and significant pro-rich inequalities (measured by the EI – first row of the table) in 
the Continental (0.0714) and Southern Europe model (0.0485) while pro-rich inequalities arise also in the Northern 
Europe model but they are much lower and not statistically significant (0.0316). However, these results are not 
conclusive as regards the degree of horizontal inequities because index estimates did not take into account 
needs distribution. Therefore, in the second row we reported Erreygers indices adjusted for needs (ENA), 
and, in general, pro-rich inequalities are also reinforced. This means that needs are more concentrated among 
poor individuals. Indeed, after adjusting for needs distribution, pro-rich inequalities increase in Northern and 
Southern Europe and they are high and statistically significant especially in Continental (0.0714) and Southern 
Europe (0.0485). Interestingly, in the Continental region, the need-adjusted index (ENA) is smaller than the 
overall index (EI), due to the role of demographic factors (i.e., age).  
              Table 2.a also shows decomposition results of Erreygers index for the use of domestic help by 
macro-region. Inequality in the probability of using both kinds of care in each macro-region is decomposed 
into the contributions of household income, need, and non-need factors.  
             Decomposition results reveal an interesting pattern of inequalities in the use of domestic help and 
some similarities across the areas analyzed. Indeed, both the direct contribution of income and the 
contribution of health needs are negative in all macro areas.  The direct contribution of income to overall 
inequalities is rather modest in all areas, while the contribution of needs ranges from around 0.9% in 
Northern area to 0.1% in Southern countries. The negative contribution of income is due to the fact that its 
partial effect on the use of domestic help is negative while the concentration index is positive and statistically 
significant. Concerning the demographic indicators, age and gender seem to have a small effect on the 
formation of inequality in Northern and Southern areas. Conversely, age is pro-rich concentrated and 
positively contributes to the formation of income-inequality in the Continental area. For this reason the total 
contribution of needs to overall inequality is positive in this area only. 
             Results display also a disproportionate concentration of needs among poor individuals, which is not 
sufficiently compensated for by a higher use of domestic help. Indeed, health need variables are all positively 
associated with the use of domestic help and they are also highly concentrated among the poor. As a 
consequence, a redistribution of domestic help among people with higher health needs would reduce income-
related inequalities. Among the set of health need variables, self-perceived health and mobility account for the 
main contribution to the overall index.  
           The decomposition exercise reveals that receiving informal care positively contributes to the overall EI 
although its contribution is significant in the Continental area only. The mechanism behind this result may be 
interesting. Indeed, as the negative sign of the partial effect suggests, informal care acts as substitute of formal 
care. At the same time, informal care is highly concentrated among the poor and this actually contributes to 
generating pro-rich inequalities in formal domestic help. A possible explanation may be the fact that 
individuals belonging to lower income groups may have financial difficulties to buy formal care services (i.e. 
housekeepers to perform domestic help). Hence, they tend to turn to informal caregivers and this actually 
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contributes to increasing the gap in the access to formal services between rich and poor and related 
inequalities.  
           Another factor contributing to the pro-rich inequality is the marital status. Indeed, non-single 
respondents are more concentrated among low-income groups (the generalized concentration indices are 
negative and significant in all three macro-areas) and they receive paid domestic help less often. As a result, 
the contribution to income-related inequality of being a non-single is positive and significant in all cases.  
Marital status can be in principle considered also as a need variable because single respondents are evidently 
more vulnerable to the need of domestic help. In this analysis we decided to consider only health problems or 
factors indirectly associated with such problems (demographics) among the needs variables. However, our 
results are not driven by this choice because needs-adjusted inequalities in favor of the rich would emerge 
also if we included marital status among the need variables.  
 
Personal nursing care 
 
        Table 2.b shows the Erreygers index estimates, partial effects and inequality contributions by macro-
areas for the utilization of professional home care.  
(Table 2.b).  
Both the EI and the ENA are positive, fairly small and statistically significant for the Continental model only. 
However, the decomposition exercise highlights some important differences across macro-area. Indeed, in 
the Northern Europe model we found that income is negatively associated with access to home care services 
while it is positively associated to the same services in the Continental and Southern Europe model. Needs 
are distributed pro-poor in all areas. As a consequence we did not find horizontal inequity in the Northern 
Europe model while we found pro-rich inequality in the other areas even though the inequality is very small 
and statistically significant in the Continental area only.  
        Concerning the non-need variables, we found that less educated individuals consume a lower amount of 
formal care in Continental and Southern Europe and this contributes positively to pro-rich inequality in these 
areas. This is in line with the differences in the direct effect of income on the use of care across areas, as 
discussed before. The contribution of informal care to overall inequalities is rather modest and this is mostly 
due to a low substitutability between any kind of informal help and personal nursing care which is a “skilled” 
and more professional type of care.  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
The purpose of the present study was to investigate the degree and the determinants of income-
related inequality in the use of home care services among older people across three macro-areas in Europe 
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which are highly heterogeneous in terms of the degree of public financing of LTC and the strength and the 
social value of family ties. Our analysis allows to shed light on the role these factors in shaping income-related 
inequalities in the use of LTC services. In order to analyze equity issues related to the provision of home care 
services, the empirical model is estimated by considering separately skilled (nursing care) and low-skilled (paid 
domestic help) formal home care. Since in both cases the measure for formal home care access is a binary 
variable, indicating whether or not respondents had any formal home care utilization, we used the Erreygers 
(2009) corrected version of the concentration index. We decomposed the Erreygers index into the 
contribution of income, need and non-need factors. Among the non-need factors, we included informal care. 
We addressed how informal care by children and formal home care interact, building Erreygers index 
decomposition on a recursive bivariate probit model which controls for the potential simultaneity between 
formal home care and informal care.  
Using cross-country comparative micro-data from SHARE (Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement 
in Europe), we find important differences between the kind of care analyzed (“skilled” vs “unskilled”) and the 
three macro-areas considered. Concerning the kind of care, we found substantial horizontal equity in the use 
of skilled home care (with the exception of Continental Europe) while we detect significant pro-rich 
inequalities in the use of low-skilled domestic care in Continental and Southern Europe. In all areas, informal 
care services instead seem to act as a sort of safety net for the poor: in particular, we found that informal care 
substitutes for low-skilled formal care and appears to be disproportionately concentrated among the worse-
off, contributing to increase the gap in the access to these services between rich and poor individuals. 
With respect to the differences between the three areas, our results show that in the Northern 
European model there is no violation of the horizontal equity principle in the provision of home care 
services. In these countries, indeed, elderly needs for personal and domestic help are expected to be met by 
the state which provides high public spending on universal services equitable for all, including LTC public 
coverage. On the other side, we found that in the Continental  European model, it appears that disadvantaged 
groups tend to face more difficulties in using home-based healthcare services. This result is also in accordance 
with the Esping-Andersen approach in which conservative countries tend to preserve social inequality and 
limit the re-distributive process. Finally, we found important inequities especially in the Southern European 
model (i.e.  Italy, Greece and Spain), characterized by highly privatized LTC systems and an extensive role of 
family in the provision of LTC services.   
Our results indicate that a higher involvement of the state in the LTC sector is correlated with a more 
equitable access to LTC services. Instead, when the provision of public LTC coverage is poor, important pro-
rich inequalities may arise. To this respect, the situation seems to be particularly worrying for the Southern 
European Countries in which LTC public insurance is weak and informal support for the elderly until today 
has been pivotal (Costa Font and Zigante, 2014). However, the de-familiarization process that is affecting 
Southern European countries, also due to a higher women’s labor force participation, is threatening the 
“Southern family model” and unpaid care provided by relatives can no longer be taken for granted. More 
 13 
generally, the increasing demand for care, in combination with a reduced potential for informal care, is likely 
to result in a need to expand LTC public coverage. A higher involvement of the State in the financing of LTC 
services may produce important social benefits. On one side, it may be desirable to guarantee equity in the 
access to LTC services. On the other side, it may encourage the labour market supply of children who are too 
often engaged in informal care assistance to their elderly parents. In our analysis, we show that the recourse 
to informal care is more pronounced for the “unskilled” type of care. For this reason, public resources to 
LTC sector might be more concentrated on this kind of care in the future. 
Of course the complete replacement of informal care by formal care is not financially feasible, since 
the public financial resources available to pay for public long term care assistance are continuously decreasing 
(Costa-Font, 2010).   An interesting compromise to the trade-off between equity of access and public 
expenditure in LTC sector is represented by the community care which is less costly than institutional  LTC 
care and appears as a sensible way of responding to elderly people’s needs while also averting demographic 
and economic crisis (Aroson and Neysmith, 1997; Chan et al., 2008).  Several European countries are aiming 
to stimulate community living and care, including home care, as a sustainable approach to ease the burden of 
care on family members and to prevent the need for long-term institutionalization in order to maintain 
individuals in their home and community as long as possible. The Elderly are thought to prefer being cared 
for in their own homes where they are presumed to be surrounded by family, friends, and others who know 
and understand them. Probably, a re-arrangement of LTC sector in this sense might be  necessary to view of 
the already urgent problem of demographic ageing, which is inevitably destined to become more pronounced 
in the near future. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
A Bivariate Model for Formal and Informal home care 
 
In the probit model used to capture the determinants of home care use, and to predict need 
standardized home care access, we included, among the dependent variables, having received informal care. 
Informal care may substitute for formal care but may be also a complement to formal care when the elderly 
suffer from severe disability and their needs are likely to exceed informal care resources (Balia and Brau, 
2013). In this application, the situation is complicated by the fact that informal care and formal home care 
may be simultaneously determined (Van Houtven and Norton, 2004). This may be due to the fact that the 
receipt of informal care may be correlated to unobserved health characteristics or to unobserved preferences 
for care that are likely to influence the demand for home care (Charles and Sevak, 2005; Bonsang, 2013).  
Thus, in order to test for the potential endogeneity of informal care we run a recursive bivariate probit model 
(Cappellari and Jenkins, 2003). This allows us to draw more robust conclusions about the extent of horizontal 
inequity in home care. 
The recursive structure of the bivariate probit model builds on a first structural form equation 
determining the receipt of formal home care and a second reduced form equation for the potentially 
endogenous dummy measuring the receipt of informal care.  Thus:  
 
1 1 1 1 2 2 1
2 2 2 2
= =
=
' '
i i i i i i
'
i i i
y x y z
y x
b e d a e
b e
*
* + + ++  (1A) 
where  iz  and 2ix  are vectors of exogenous variables, α  and 2β  are parameter vectors, 2δ  is a scalar 
parameter. 1iε  and 2iε  are the error terms distributed as bivariate normal, each with a mean zero and a 
variance covariance matrix Σ . Σ has values of 1 on the leading diagonal and correlations 1,2 =ρ  2,1ρ  on off-
diagonal elements. In the above setting, the exogeneity condition is stated in terms of the correlation 
coefficient, which can be interpreted as the correlation between the unobservable explanatory variables of the 
two equations. The equations in (1A) can be estimated separately as single probit model only in the case of 
independent error terms, i.e. the correlation coefficient is not significantly different from zero. The 
parameters of the equations are not identified if iz  includes all the variables in 2ix . Estimation requires some 
considerations for the identification of the model parameters. Maddala (1983) proposes that at least one of 
the reduced-form exogenous variables ( 2ix ) not be included in the structural equations as explanatory 
variables. Following Maddala's approach we impose exclusion restrictions. For the reduced form (i.e. informal 
care equation), we use a variable assumed to affect directly only informal care but not the probability of 
receiving formal home care. In particular, for the reduced form we use the children’s gender as the main 
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explanation for the informal care received by the elderly (see also Bonsang, 2009).  We consider gender 
composition of the children by using the proportion of daughters over the total number of children within 
the household. Following Bonsang (2009), we assume that the proportion of daughters directly affects only 
informal care but not the probability of receiving formal home care. Many studies show that daughters 
provide more care to their parents than do sons (see, for instance, Horowitz, 1985).  
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APPENDIX II 
 
Figure 1. Long-term care public expenditure (health and social components), as share of GDP, 2011 (or nearest year) 
 
 
 
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         Note: The OECD average only includes the 11 countries that report health and social LTC. 
   
     
Source: OECD Health Statistics 2013, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/health-data-en. 
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Table 1a: Descriptive Statistics, overall sample 
         
        Variable     Description Mean  Sd Min  Max  
        Utilization 
       
        Personal nursing 
care 
 
1 if having received any of the following forms of 
home 0,078 0,268 0 1 
   
care during the last 12 months: (1) Professional or 
    
   
 paid nursing or personal care; (2) Meals on wheels 
    
        Paid Domestic 
Help 
 
1 if having received Professional or paid home 
help,  0,092 0,289 0 1 
   
for domestic tasksn that you could not perform  
    
   
yourself due to health problems. 
    
        Need Variables 
      
        Age 
  
Age in years 74,15 6,28 66 104 
Female  
  
1 if female 0,53 0,49 0 1 
Health conditions 
 
Number of health conditions out of 10 listed 2,03 1,6 0 10 
Self-reported 
health 
 
Self-reported health on a scale from 1 to 5 
(1=excellent; 5=bad) 
    1. excellent 
   
.065 .248 0 1 
2. very good 
   
.140  .347 0 1 
3. good 
   
.364  .481 0 1 
4. fair  
   
.310  .462 0 1 
5. poor  
   
.117 .322 0 1 
Symptoms 
  
Number of symptoms out of 11 listed 2,03 2 0 11 
Mobility 
  
Number of functional limitations out of 10 listed 2,06 2,46 0 10 
         
 
Non-Need Variables 
       
 
       
Equivalent Income  
  
4337,8
4 
7553,7
3 
83,6
7 
33095
5 
Informal care 
 
1 if having received (on a weekly basis) any of the  0,04 0,21 0 1 
   
following forms of informal care during the last 12 
months: 
    
   
(1) Personal care; (2) Practical household help; (3) 
Help with 
    
   
paperwork. 
    Low_Education 
  
0,6 0,48 0 1 
Medium_Educatio
n 
  
0,24 0,43 0 1 
 20 
High_Education 
  
0,14 0,35 0 1 
Retired 
  
1 if respondent is retired 0,83 0,37 0 1 
Rural 
   
0,48 0,49 0 1 
                
Number of 
observations: 9239 
      
 
Table 1.b: Descriptive Statistics, Northen Europe       
        Variable       Mean  Sd Min Max 
        Dependent Variables: 
      
        Personal nursing care
  
.058 .234 0 1 
Paid Domestic Help 
  
.119 .324 0 1 
        Need variables 
      Age 
   
74.3  6.42 66 98 
Female  
   
.514 .499 0 1 
Health conditions 
  
1.977 1.617 0 10 
Self-reported health: 
      1. excellent 
   
.126 .332 0 1 
2. very good  
  
.197 .398 0 1 
3. good  
   
.341 .474 0 1 
4. fair 
   
 .264  .441 0 1 
5. poor 
   
.068 .253 0 1 
Symptoms 
   
 1.74  1.83 0 11 
Mobility 
   
1.413  1.97 0 10 
Non-Need Variables 
      Equivalent Income  
  
 4093.80 4979.91 416.37 91208.48 
Informal care 
  
.036 .187 0 1 
More than 10 hours per 
week 8.11% 
    More than 20 hours per 
week 3.36% 
    Low_Education 
  
.537 .498 0 1 
Medium_Education 
  
.265  .441 0 1 
High_Education 
  
.193  .395 0 1 
Retired 
   
.901 .297 0 1 
Rural 
   
.364  .481 0 1 
                
Number of 
observations: 2812 
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Table 1.c: Descriptive Statistics, Continental 
Europe       
        Variable       Mean  Sd Min Max 
        Dependent Variables: 
      
        Personal nursing 
care 
  
.125 .331 0 1 
Paid Domestic Help 
  
 .106  .308 0 1 
        Need variables 
      Age 
   
 74.22  6.28 66 100 
Female  
   
.551 .497 0 1 
Health conditions 
  
 1.93   1.50 0 10 
Self-reported health: 
      1. excellent 
   
.044  .205 0 1 
2. very good  
  
.125 .330 0 1 
3. good  
   
.397 .489 0 1 
4. fair 
   
 .309 .462 0 1 
5. poor 
   
.124  .329 0 1 
Symptoms 
   
2.14 1.98 0 11 
Mobility 
   
 2.10 2.49 0 10 
Non-Need Variables 
      Equivalent Income  
  
 5498.42 8915.73 83.67 250953 
Informal care 
  
.0572 .232 0 1 
More than 10 hours per 
week 20.53% 
    More than 20 hours per 
week 10.68% 
    Low_Education 
  
 .468 .499 0 1 
Medium_Education 
  
.341 .474 0 1 
High_Education 
  
.185 .388 0 1 
Retired 
   
.865 .341 0 1 
Rural 
   
.568 .495 0 1 
                
Number of 
observations: 3653 
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Table 1.d: Descriptive Statistics, Southern Europe       
        Variable       Mean  Sd Min Max 
        Dependent Variables: 
      
        Personal nursing 
care 
  
.035 .185 0 1 
Paid Domestic Help 
  
.047 .212 0 1 
        Need variables 
      Age 
   
73.92 6.12 66 104 
Female  
   
 .518 .499 0 1 
Health conditions 
  
2.23 1.69 0 10 
Self-reported health: 
      1. excellent 
   
.0324 .177 0 1 
2. very good  
  
.104 .305 0 1 
3. good  
   
.345 .475 0 1 
4. fair 
   
.360 .480 0 1 
5. poor 
   
.157 .364 0 1 
Symptoms 
   
2.18 2.16 0 11 
Mobility 
   
2.681 2.689 0 10 
Non-Need Variables 
      Equivalent Income  
  
 3056.90 7535.48  97.30 330955 
Informal care 
  
.046 .211 0 1 
More than 10 hours per 
week 41% 
    More than 20 hours per 
week 28.22% 
    Low_Education 
  
.847 .359 0 1 
Medium_Education 
  
.103 .30 0 1 
High_Education 
  
.049  .21 0 1 
Retired 
   
.715 .451 0 1 
Rural 
   
.485 .499 0 1 
                
Number of 
observations: 2774 
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Table 2.a :  Contributions to Inequality in the probability of using Paid Domestic Help 
                
      North Continental  South     
   
Biprobit Biprobit Biprobit 
  EI (predicted) 
 
0.0316 0.0714 0.0485 
  ENA 
  
0.0325 0.0710 0.0506 
  EI (residual) 
 
0.0333 0.0695 0,0492 
  
        Income 
       Partial effect 
 
 -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0001 
  CI 
  
0.4553 0.4975 0.5228 
  Contribution 
 
 -0.0042  -0.0088  -0.0074 
  Contribut ion o f  income 
     
        Need Variables 
      Age  
       Partial effect 
 
0.0012 0.0013 0.0010 
  CI 
  
 -0.0006 0.0036  -0.0015 
  Contribution 
 
 -0.0002 0.0014  -0.0004 
  SPHS 
       Partial effect 
 
0.0017 0.0015 0.0039 
  CI 
  
 -0.0072  -0.0072  -0.0108 
  Contribution 
 
 -0.0001  -0.0001  -0.0006 
  Mobility 
       Partial effect 
 
0.0032 0.0028 0.0015 
  CI 
  
 -0.0150  -0.0268  -0.0352 
  Contribution 
 
 -0.0002  -0.0006  -0.0005 
  Symptoms 
       Partial effect 
 
0.0013 0.0015 0.0009 
  CI 
  
 -0.0223   -0.0162  -0.0269 
  Contribution 
 
 -0.00021  -0.0002  -0.0002 
  Health_conditions 
      Partial effect 
 
0.0004 0.0008 0.0021 
  CI 
  
 -0.0156  -0.0066  -0.0108 
  Contribution 
 
0.0000  -0.0001  -0.0002 
  Female 
       Partial effect 
 
 -0.0009 0.0012  -0.0010 
  CI 
  
0.0005 0.0123 0.0204 
  Contribution 
 
0.0000 0.0000  -0.0001 
  Contribut ion o f  need- fac tors   -0.0009 0.0004  -0.0021 
  
        Non- need Variables 
     Informal  
       Partial effect 
 
 -0.0075  -0.0093  -0.0131 
  CI 
  
 -0.1684  -0.1688  -0.0264 
  Contribution 
 
0.0001 0.0003  0.0001 
  Low_education 
      Partial effect 
 
0.0018  -0.0025 0.0073 
  CI 
  
 -0.0434  -0.0875 -0,0599 
  Contribution 
 
 -0.0001 0.0004  -0.0015 
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High_education 
      Partial effect 
 
 -0.0048  -0.0069  0.0013 
  CI 
  
0.1269 0.1918 0.4077 
  Contribution 
 
 -0.0004  -0.0009  -0.0001 
  Living with someone 
      Partial effect 
 
 -0.0229  -0.0361  -0.0327 
  CI 
  
 -0.0795   -0.1014  -0.1018 
  Contribution 
 
0.0050 0.0095 0.0094 
  Retired 
       Partial effect 
 
 -0.0029  -0.0022  -0.0041 
  CI 
  
 -0.0124 0.0329 0.0408 
  Contribution 
 
0.0001  -0.0002  -0.0004 
  Rural 
       Partial effect 
 
 -0.0029 0.0002  -0.0073 
  CI 
  
 -0.1123  -0.0593  -0.0669 
  Contribution 
 
0.0004  -0.0001 0.0009 
  Contribut ion o f  non-need 
fac tors  0.0051 0.0090 0.0083     
Country f ixed-e f f e c t s :  
contr ibut ions  -0.0017 0.0013 0.0005 
                  
Notes: Decomposition based on a linear approximation using the average marginal effects 
from recursive bivariate probits. Significant  , EI and contributions in bold (P<0.1) 
 Netherlands, Belgium and Greece omitted because of collinearity. 
  All models include country 
dummies. 
     Estimated correlation coefficients of Domestic help equation: 
    - North: 0.659 (0.198) 
      - Continental: 0.699 (0.136) 
      - South: 0.894 (0.071) 
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Table 2.b :  Contributions to Inequality in the probability of using Personal home care 
              
      North Continental  South   
   
Biprobit Probit  Probit  
 EI (predicted) 
 
0.0023 0.0102 0.0024 
 ENA 
  
0.0036 0.0122 0.0059 
 EI (residual) 
 
0,0037  -0.0086 -0,0057 
 
       Income 
      Partial effect 
 
-0,0002 0.0001 0.0001 
 CI 
  
0.4553 0.4975 0.5228 
 Contribution 
 
  -0.0039 0.0047 0.0006 
 Contribut ion o f  income 
    
       Need Variables 
     Age  
      Partial effect 
 
0.0014 0.0049 0.0009 
 CI 
  
 -0.0006 0.0036  -0.0015 
 Contribution 
 
 -0.0002 0.0053  -0.0004 
 SPHS 
      Partial effect 
 
0.0017 0.0255 0.0053 
 CI 
  
 -0.0072  -0.0072  -0.0108 
 Contribution 
 
  -0.0001  -0.0024  -0.0008 
 Mobility 
      Partial effect 
 
0.0052 0.0156 0.0034 
 CI 
  
 -0.0150  -0.0268  -0.0352 
 Contribution 
 
 -0.0004  -0.0035  -0.0013 
 Symptoms 
      Partial effect 
 
0.0024 0.0042 0.0019 
 CI 
  
 -0.0223  -0.0162  -0.0269 
 Contribution 
 
 -0.0003  -0.0005  -0.0004 
 Health_conditions 
     Partial effect 
 
 -0.0003 0.0041 0.0002 
 CI 
  
 -0.0156  -0.0066  -0.0108 
 Contribution 
 
0.0000  -0.0002  -0.0001 
 Female 
      Partial effect 
 
 -0.0073  -0.0206  -0.0108 
 CI 
  
0.0005 0.0123 0.0203 
 Contribution 
 
 -0.0001  -0.0005  -0.0004 
 Contribut ion o f  need- fac tors   -0.0011  -0.0019  -0.0035 
 
       Non- need Variables 
    Informal  
      Partial effect 
 
 -0.0155 0.0255  -0.0016 
 CI 
  
 -0.1684  -0.1688  -0.0264 
 Contribution 
 
0.0003  -0.0009 0.0000 
 Low_education 
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Partial effect 
 
0.0043  -0.0212  -0.0202 
 CI 
  
 -0.0434  -0.0875  -0.0599 
 Contribution 
 
 -0.0004 0.0034 0.0041 
 High_education 
     Partial effect 
 
 -0.0122  -0.0256  -0.0049 
 CI 
  
0.1269 0.1918 0.4077 
 Contribution 
 
 -0.0011  -0.0036  -0.0003 
 Living with someone 
     Partial effect 
 
 -0.0281  -0.0437  -0.0001 
 CI 
  
 -0.0795  -0.1014  -0.1018 
 Contribution 
 
0.0061 0.0115 0.0000 
 Retired 
      Partial effect 
 
 -0.0093 0.0046  -0.0151 
 CI 
  
 -0.0124 0.0329 0.0408 
 Contribution 
 
0.0004 0.0005  -0.0017 
 Rural 
      Partial effect 
 
 -0.0045 0.0135  -0.0087 
 CI 
  
 -0.1123  -0.0593  -0.0669 
 Contribution 
 
0.0007  -0.0018 0.0011 
 Contribut ion o f  non-need 
fac tors  0.0060 0.0091 0.0031 
 Country f ixed-e f f e c t s :  
contr ibut ions  -0.0025 0.0069 0.0025 
               
Notes: Decomposition based on a linear approximation using the average marginal effects 
from univariate and bivariate probits. Significant  , EI and contributions in bold (P<0.1) 
Netherlands, Belgium and Greece omitted because of collinearity. 
  All models include country 
dummies. 
    Estimated correlation coefficients of Personal home care equation: 
   - North: 0.766 (0.205) 
     - Continental: 0.04 (0.22) 
     - South: 0.512 (0.262) 
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Table 3.a: Paid domestic help:  Marginal effects from probit and biprobit models 
 Northern Europe      (1)    (2)   
 
         Equivalent income  
  
0.000 (0.000) 0.0001 (0.000) 
 Informal care 
  
0.032* (0.019)  -0.0075*** (0.352) 
 Fraction of daughters       0.0037* (0.132) 
 Age  
   
0.006*** (0.000) 0.0012*** (0.006) 
 Female  
   
0.016** (0.007)  -0.0009* (0.09) 
 Self-perceived health 
  
0.018*** (0.003) 0.0017** (0.045) 
 Mobility 
   
0.013*** (0.001) 0.0032*** (0.019) 
 Health conditions  
  
0.004* (0.002) 0.0004* (0.026) 
 Symptoms  
  
0.000 (0.001) 0.0013 (0.024) 
 Low education 
  
0.000 (0.007) 0.0018 (0.094) 
 High education 
  
0.005 (0.011)  -0.0048 (0.126) 
 Non-single living  
  
 -0.083*** (0.012)  -0.0229*** (0.084) 
 Retired 
   
0.002 (0.010) 0.011 (0.134) 
 Rural 
   
 -0.009 (0.006)  -0.0029 (0.083) 
 Sweden 
   
 -0.071*** (0.009)  -0.093*** (0.12) 
 Denmark        - 0.014* (0.007)  -0.021* (0.105) 
 Notes: The coefficients reported are marginal effects from probit and biprobit models. 
 Standard errors in brackets. 
      Netherlands omitted because of 
collinearity. 
     Estimated correlation coefficient for the recursive bivariate probit (rho): 0.659 (0.198) 
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Table 3.b: Paid domestic help:  Marginal effects from probit and biprobit models 
 Continental Europe      (1)    (2)   
 
         Equivalent income  
  
0.000 (0.000)  -0.0001 (0.000) 
 Informal care 
  
0.024* (0.014)  -0.0093** (0.242) 
 Fraction of daughters       0.009*** (0.103) 
 
         Age  
   
0.0050*** (0.000) 0.0013*** (0.005) 
 Female  
   
0.014* (0.007) 0.0012* (0.077) 
 Self-perceived health 
  
0.0120** (0.004) 0.0015** (0.042) 
 Mobility 
   
 0.012*** (0.001) 0.0028*** 0.015) 
 Health conditions  
  
0.003 (0.002) 0.0008 (0.023) 
 Symptoms  
  
0.005* (0.001) 0.0015** (0.019) 
 Low education 
  
 -0.018* (0.007)  -0.0025* (0.079) 
 High education 
  
 -0.006 (0.009)  -0.0069 (0.108) 
 Non-single living  
  
 -0.041*** (0.009)  -0.0361*** (0.080) 
 Retired 
   
 -0.003 (0.009)  -0.0022 (0.090) 
 Rural 
   
 -0.004 (0.006) 0.0002 (0.065) 
 Austria 
   
 -0.038*** (0.005)  -0.0713*** (0.113) 
 France 
   
0.0160* (0.006)  -0.027*** (0.081) 
 Germany        -0.058*** (0.006)  -0.008*** (0.113) 
 Notes: The coefficients reported are marginal effects from probit (1)and biprobit models (2). 
Standard errors in brackets.  
      Belgium omitted because of 
collinearity. 
     Estimated correlation coefficient for the recursive bivariate probit (rho): 0.699 (0.136) 
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Table 3.c: Paid domestic help:  Marginal effects from probit and biprobit models 
Southern Europe      (1)    (2)   
        Equivalent income 
  
0.000 (0.000) -0.0001 (0.000) 
Informal care 
  
0.005 (0.008) -0.0131*** (0.191) 
Fraction of daughters 
    
0.0002* (0.113) 
Age 
   
0.001*** (0.000) 0.0010*** (0.006) 
Female 
   
0.007 (0.005) -0.0010 (0.111) 
Self-perceived health 
  
0.009*** (0.003) 0.0039*** (0.065) 
Mobility 
   
0.003*** (0.001) 0.0015*** (0.070) 
Health conditions 
  
0.003* (0.001) 0.0021* (0.030) 
Symptoms 
  
0.001 (0.001) 0.0009 (0.024) 
Low education 
  
-0.011 (0.009) 0.0073 (0.182) 
High education 
  
-0.003 (0.013) 0.0013 (0.295) 
Non-single living 
  
-0.014*** (0.007) -0.0327*** (0.097) 
Retired 
   
0.004 (0.004) -0.0041 (0.107) 
Rural 
   
-0.012** (0.004) -0.0073*** (0.093) 
Italy 
   
0.018 (0.005) 0.001 (0.113) 
Greece 
   
0.021*** (0.005) -0.057 (0.146) 
Notes: The coefficients reported are marginal effects from probit and biprobit models. 
Standard errors in brackets. 
     Spain omitted because of 
collinearity.  
    
Estimated correlation coefficient for the recursive bivariate probit (rho): 0.894 (0.071) 
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Table 4.a: Personal care:  Marginal effects from probit and biprobit models 
 Northern Europe      (1)    (2)   
        Equivalent income  
  
0.000  (0.000)  -0.0002 (0.000) 
Informal care 
  
0,017** (0.013)  -0.0155** (0.101) 
Fraction of daughters       .0080* (.116) 
Age  
   
0,001*** (0.000) 0.0014*** (0.006) 
Female  
   
-0,001 (0,004)  -0.0073 (0.091) 
Self-perceived health 
  
0,008*** (0,002) 0.0017*** (0.051) 
Mobility 
   
0,004*** (0,001) 0.0052*** (0.02) 
Health conditions  
  
0,001 (0,001)  -0.0003 (0.028) 
Symptoms  
  
0.000 (0,001) 0.0024 (0.023) 
Low education 
  
0,006 (0,004) 0.0043* (0.104) 
High education 
  
0,005 (0,007)  -0.0122 (0.143) 
Non-single living  
  
 -0,021*** (0,005)  -0.0281*** (0.091) 
Retired 
   
0,001 (0,006)  -0.0093 (0.152) 
Rural 
   
0,000 (0,004)  -0.0045 (0.088) 
Sweden 
   
 -0,025*** (0,004)  -0.007*** (0.12) 
Denmark       0,0050* (0,006) 0.0018 (0.117) 
Notes: The coefficients reported are marginal effects from probit and biprobit models. 
Standard errors in brackets. 
     Netherlands omitted because of 
collinearity. 
    Estimated correlation coefficient for the recursive bivariate probit (rho): 0.766 (0.205) 
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Table 4.b: Personal care:  Marginal effects from probit and biprobit models 
Continental Europe      (1)    (2)   
        Equivalent income  
  
0.0001 (0.000)  -0.0001 (0.000) 
Informal care 
  
0.0255 (0.018) 0.0003 (0.337) 
Fraction of daughters       0.0024*** (0.104) 
        Age  
   
0.0049*** (0.000) 0.0002*** (0.005) 
Female  
   
 -0.0206* (0.009)  -0.0007 (0.023) 
Self-perceived health 
  
0.0255*** (0.005) 0.0007*** (0.04) 
Mobility 
   
0.0156*** (0.002) 0.0007*** (0.01) 
Health conditions  
  
0.0041 (0.003) 0.0002 (0.023) 
Symptoms  
  
0.0042* (0.002) 0.0003* (0.019) 
Low education 
  
 -0.0212* (0.009)  -0.0008* (0.071) 
High education 
  
 -0.0256* (0.011)  -0.0015* (0.103) 
Non-single living  
  
 -0.0437*** (0.011)  -0.0086*** (0.08) 
Retired 
   
0.0046 (0.012)  -0.0001 (0.094) 
Rural 
   
0.0135 (0.008) 0.0004 (0.063) 
Austria 
   
 -0.808*** (0.007)  -0.0020*** (0.116) 
France 
   
0.167* (0.008)  -0.0011* (0.074) 
Germany        -0.021*** (0.008)  -0.0026*** (0.104) 
Notes: The coefficients reported are marginal effects from probit (1) and biprobit models (2). 
Standard errors in brackets. 
     Belgium omitted because of 
collinearity. 
    Estimated correlation coefficient for the recursive bivariate probit (rho): 0.044 (0.179) 
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Table 4.c: Personal care:  Marginal effects from probit and biprobit models 
 Southern Europe      (1)    (2)   
        Equivalent income  
  
0.0001 
 
 -0.0001 (0.000) 
Informal care 
  
 -0.0016 (0.005)  -0.0022* (0.464) 
Fraction of daughters       0.0011* (0.264) 
Age  
   
0.0009*** (0.000) 0.0002*** (0.008) 
Female  
   
 -0.0108* (0.004)  -0.0024** (0.145) 
Self-perceived health 
  
0.0053* (0.002) 0.0010* (0.082) 
Mobility 
   
0.0034*** (0.000) 0.0006*** (0.024) 
Health conditions  
  
0.0002 (0.000) 0.0002 (0.036) 
Symptoms  
  
0.0019* (0.000) 0.0004* (0.029) 
Low education 
  
 -0.0202* (0.010)  0.0000 (0.000) 
High education 
  
 -0.0049 (0.005)  -0.0010 (0.326) 
Non-single living  
  
 -0.0001 (0.003)  -0.0039 (0.150) 
Retired 
   
 -0.0151*** (0.006)  -0.0038*** (0.138) 
Rural 
   
 -0.0087** (0.003)  -0.0022*** (0.113) 
Italy 
   
 -0.005 (0.003)  -0.0157 (0.132) 
Greece        -0.015*** (0.003)  -0.046*** (0.171) 
Notes: The coefficients reported are marginal effects from probit and biprobit models. 
Standard errors in brackets. 
     Spain omitted because of 
collinearity. 
    Estimated correlation coefficient for the recursive bivariate probit (rho): 0.471 (0.264) 
 
 
 
